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In Perspective —
THE I N T E R N A T I O N A L
MONETARY FUND

by Roderick F. McDonald
Foreign cars and other imports have suddenly be-

Most business people are aware of the existence of

come considerably more expensive in the United States,

the International Monetary Fund and are to some extent

and Americans abroad find their dollars less valuable.

appreciative of the important role it plays in international

These facts, which represent relatively minor misfor-

monetary affairs. It may be useful to readers of

tunes to most Americans, serve as a reminder that with-

to review the objectives and activities of the IMF and

out the self-discipline in monetary matters accepted by

place it in proper perspective as a key institution exert-

many nations back in 1944, we might have been suffer-

ing powerful effects on the fortunes of all of us who live

ing disaster rather than misfortune, and in this period

in countries belonging to the Fund.

there could have been many such disasters.
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This review will highlight the things the IMF is intended
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3. Free foreign-exchange markets, without government restrictions that would hamper the growth of
world trade.
4. A multilateral system of international payments.
5. Machinery for international monetary consultation
and cooperation.

to do as well as some of the things it is not. It will also
indicate the philosophy of international monetary policy
on which the IMF is based. Such a review is timely
because some of the basic premises on which the Fund
operates are now being challenged in the light of problems that have been developing for some time in the
foreign-exchange markets and have reached the point
where important decisions are being made.

The Gold Exchange Standard. The IMF was founded to
support and strengthen the workings of the international
gold exchange standard, which has evolved from the
traditional gold standard during the twentieth century.
The international gold standard is based on the premise
that gold is the ultimate value for settling international
balances and, in fact, is the only final instrument for
measuring and protecting the value of money on which
human beings, regardless of nationality, can depend
indefinitely and unconditionally against all uncertainties.
Under this premise, gold is the only basis for money
value that can be counted on always to be completely
acceptable, anywhere in the world. It is the only safeguard against the fact that public powers cannot be
depended upon to live up to their obligations or promises to maintain the value of money. History contains
many examples that demonstrate this proposition.

Background. As World War II approached its end, the
world was badly in need of a revitalization of world trade
and monetary management. The war would leave a legacy of dislocated national economies and international
trade, extensive artificial controls of foreign exchange
and international investment markets, a number of major nations near bankruptcy and, of course, shattered
industrial plants over wide areas.
Free-world planners were convinced it was a prime
necessity to set up a postwar system of stable international currencies and an organization within which
nations could assist one another in maintaining that
stability. This was seen as essential for the revival of
international trade, without which the prospects for economic recovery and world-wide prosperity after the war
would be dim indeed. For this purpose the IMF was
created through the Bretton Woods international conference in 1944 and began operations officially in
March 1947. There are now 120 member nations. This
compares with 131 members in the United Nations currently. Yugoslavia is the only Eastern European communist country with IMF membership.

Under a gold-exchange standard, a country establishes its monetary unit to represent a specified weight
of gold and undertakes to redeem its paper money on
demand, either in gold or in a "reserve currency," which
is itself redeemable in gold and is expected to be always
universally accepted as being "as good as gold." The
U.S. dollar has been the generally used reserve currency.

As indicated in the IMF Articles of Agreement, the
essence of the Fund's purpose is to facilitate expansion
and balanced growth of international trade as a vital
element in promotion of a high level of employment and
real income in all member nations and to this end facilitate the development of their productive resources. The
major premises incorporated into the Fund's organization and operating philosophy as essential to achieve
this purpose are:
1. A system of fixed exchange rates under an international gold-exchange standard, for avoidance of
the competitive-exchange depreciation that could
lead to monetary chaos.

A key point is that the gold-exchange standard imposes a strict discipline on a national administration.
It must not create so much money, relative to the
strength of its monetary reserves, that domestically it
loses the confidence of its citizens against inflation,
which causes them to demand and hoard gold or its
equivalent. Internationally, the country must succeed
in balancing its payments. Otherwise, gold or the reserve currency will be demanded in settlement of
foreign claims, although temporarily, borrowing from
outside sources may tide the administration over a shortterm problem situation.

2. A substantial fund of gold and other monetary reserves, contributed by the members and used for
mutual assistance in helping correct temporary
maladjustments in their international-payment balances, in order to shorten the duration and lessen
the degree of imbalances.

Monetary or fiscal mismanagement which results in
inflation of the money supply will generate a drain of
monetary reserves, domestically or internationally or
both. This will force a shrinkage in quantity of money
and a deflation of prices, wages and other costs, in order
to correct the situation which caused the inflation in the
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etary and fiscal management and genuine effort by the
member, supported by the assistance it can obtain from
other members and the IMF.
When forced to change its official parity by development of a fundamental disequilibrium, a member may
make any change up to ten percent without prior consultation with the IMF. The Articles of Agreement provide
that the IMF will not raise any objection to a change
within that range. Larger changes are not to be made
without prior consultation with the IMF and the IMF will
concur if it agrees that the change is needed to correct
a fundamental disequilibrium. In that case, the resources
of the IMF are used to assist the member to make a
smooth transition. However, if a member changes its parity over the objections of the IMF, the support of the
Fund's resources may not be made available and compulsory withdrawal by the member may result.
Member countries also pledged themselves to the
ideal of free foreign exchange markets as quickly as
their postwar economic conditions would permit. During
the postwar period exchange controls were removed
gradually, although in the developing countries this ideal
is still some distance from full realization. The IMF publishes annual reports on exchange restrictions, use of
multiple exchange rates and other control devices still
in effect. It should be noted that under the IMF Articles
of Agreement, an exception is made to this pledge and
members may exercise exchange controls where exchange problems are due to capital movements.
The philosophy of the IMF is that fixed, free market
exchange rates, with the minimum of government controls or other interference with the exchange markets
will minimize exchange uncertainties which hamper
trade and will encourage international trade, travel and
investment to flourish—and they have.
The IMF system is designed to provide flexibility and
aids to liquidity which will enable members to cope with
reasonable payment imbalances without threatening
their ofiicial parity. It also recognizes that exchange
rates must be realistic and that fundamental economic
developments may render changes necessary. The rates
set originally in 1946 proved to be too high in some cases
and revisions were made. In situations where fundamental adjustments later became necessary, the resources of the IMF have been a powerful support to
members.

first place. It is a hard discipline, usually accompanied
by increased unemployment and other problems, but if
defending the value of its money is a nation's primary
goal, the gold-exchange standard will do the job.
It is a truism that, under the automatic workings of
the gold-exchange standard, the surest way for a nation
to get itself into monetary difficulties is to persist in
running government expenditures well beyond the limit
of its will or its capacity to levy taxes, creating deficits
that are covered by inflating the money supply; also,
over an extended period to buy or spend more abroad
than it sells or otherwise has the resources for payment.
Many devices have been developed to postpone the
working of this disciplinary force, but a moment of truth
has to be faced eventually.
At that point, the nation may default and reduce the
value of its monetary unit in an attempt to avoid the
sacrifices involved in maintaining its commitment. Since
there is no fully effective sanction against such a default,
experience has shown this to be perhaps the greatest
weakness of the system. However, if a permanent decline takes place in the economic position of a nation
notwithstanding its best efforts, devaluation would be
logical and unavoidable in recognition of the decline.
A devaluation in such circumstances would not be
inconsistent with the philosophy of the gold-exchange
standard. Naturally, in case of devaluation of the reserve
currency, the effects could be especially serious and
would be shared by all nations to the extent they were
holding the reserve currency as part of their monetary
reserves.
Monetary Commitments of IMF Members. Members committed themselves to the international gold-exchange
standard by fixing their monetary units at specified
weights in gold or in relation to the U.S. dollar with its
gold content of .888671 gram as of July 1, 1944—equivalent to a gold price of US$35 per ounce. They agreed
to maintain that parity in the foreign-exchange markets.
This commitment does not necessarily include adherence to the gold-exchange standard domestically. The
United States does not redeem its money for its citizens
in gold and they are not free to buy and hold gold.
Members agreed to limit exchange fluctuations to no
more than one percent up or down from official par.
They also agreed to refrain from changing official parity
unless forced to do so to correct a fundamental disequilibrium in the balance of payments. Thus the commitment to maintain parity is not absolute. But it does
apply to situations that can be met by responsible mon-

This outline indicates the extent to which IMF members
have voluntarily surrendered a significant part of their
sovereign freedom to manipulate the international value
of their currencies and have pledged to observe a code
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of behavior for common benefit, based on free foreignexchange markets and fixed rates of exchange.
IMF Organization and Resources. The IMF is directed
by a Board of Governors and a group of Executive Directors. These are chosen and exercise their powers on
behalf of the member countries under a rather complex
voting system which, in effect, gives weight to the votes
of members in relation to their contributions to the resources of the IMF. These contributions are made in
accordance with assigned quotas, which are based on
the amount of each member's national income and its
share of world trade.
Quotas are reviewed and adjusted at intervals not
exceeding five years. The latest review was in 1969 and
the total of all quotas was increased to US$28.5 billion
from the previous total of US$21.3 billion. There are
seven members with quotas of US$1 billion or more:

U.S.A.
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Japan
Canada
Italy

$6.7
2.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.1
1.0

These seven provide 55 percent of the total. Other
quotas range downward to US$5 million.
A quota may also be adjusted at any time on request
of the member and concurrence by a prescribed majority
of the membership, as provided in the Articles of Agreement. Consent of the member country is required before
any change in its quota can become effective.
Each member contributes 25 percent of its quota in
gold and 75 percent in its own currency. In a very real
sense, these funds are a central international reserve
behind the currency values of the members. When it
needs other currencies for settling payment balances,
a member may borrow them from the Fund in exchange
for its own, for periods of from three to five years. This
period is designed to give the member time to solve
temporary problems. The time limit emphasizes that it

is not intended to maintain an unrealistic exchange rate
indefinitely.
Lending by the IMF is automatic up to the amount of
a member's gold contribution (25 percent of quota).
Loans beyond that amount are available and may exceed the member's total quota by special arrangement.
The IMF derives revenues from charges on its loans. If
the amount of a member's currency held by the Fund
as a result of borrowing remains in excess of its quota
for a period of more than three months, a special charge
is levied. All loan charges are payable in gold. Since gold
cannot earn income while held in its vaults, the IMF
transferred some of its gold holdings to the U.S. Treasury
with right of repurchase, in exchange for interest-bearing
Treasury obligations, thereby supplementing its income.
The total of these transfers was US$800 million, reduced
to US$400 million by repurchase during 1970.
Special Drawing Rights. With the substantial growth of
world trade during the past two decades, some concern
arose in international monetary circles as to whether
total world monetary reserves, including the resources
and lending capacity of the IMF, might prove inadequate
for all members to maintain enough liquidity for continued growth. To guard against the danger of problems
arising from inadequate reserves, the IMF put into effect
on January 1, 1970, a system of Special Drawing Rights
(SDRs). The total number SDRs created now stands at
9.3 billion. These have been allotted to members pro rata
in accordance with their individual quota contributions
to the IMF.
The SDRs are defined as having the same value as
an equal number of U.S. dollars in gold. Members have
agreed to accept them in settlement of international balances, with the limitation that no member is required to
accept SDRs beyond a total amount equal to three times
its IMF quota contribution. Interest is earned by members on SDRs received in settlements and held. At present, members are expected to leave on deposit with the
IMF an average of 30 percent of the SDRs allotted to
them—an international compensating balance. If at any
time a member's drawings of SDRs exceed 70 percent
of its allotment, such excess must be redeposited and
the 30 percent average restored. Because of the members' commitment to accept them in settlement of
claims, SDRs are a new addition to each member's
international monetary reserves.
Creation of reserve assets is an important extension
of the international monetary system and is only possible because of the cooperative participation of trading

nations through the IMF. The universal acceptance of
SDRs means that they supplement a member's gold
and dollar exchange holdings as reserves supporting
the official parity of its currency. In its 1971 Annual Report, the IMF announced that the SDRs have now become established as usable and acceptable reserve
assets; that participants have been willing to acquire
and hold them and have been able to use them readily
to obtain needed foreign exchange.

jointly agreed to discontinue supplying gold to the public gold markets, although they continued to buy and sell
gold to central banks at the official parity of US$35 per
ounce. This reflected a situation where the public markets apparently had become convinced that the gold
value of the U.S. dollar could not be maintained indefinitely at that level.
This was an important limitation on the convertibility
of currencies into gold, especially serious because it
related to the reserve currency—the U.S. dollar. Subsequently, in August 1971 the U.S. withdrew completely
its commitment to redeem U.S. dollars in gold. From
that time the system has no longer been in fact a goldexchange standard.

Parity Problems. Throughout the years of its operations,
the IMF has assisted with loans of foreign currencies
when a member country found itself with a problem in
maintaining the official parity of its currency. In some
cases, devaluation nevertheless became necessary and
smoother transition to a lower parity was facilitated by
IMF assistance. Naturally, this assistance has been more
vital to countries with the greatest problems of adverse
payments balances. However, countries whose balances
have been consistently favorable and currencies strong
have also benefited indirectly from the general stability
of exchange rates, under which their foreign trade has
prospered.

New Developments. As a result of negotiations initiated
late in 1971, some important monetary changes have
been decided upon by the major IMF member countries.
These include:
1. Devaluation of the U.S. dollar by an increase in
gold price to $38 per ounce, but without resumption of dollar convertibility into gold.
2. Prompt adoption of new higher official par values
for most other major currencies.

During 1971 some serious international payment imbalances, accompanied by volatile international movements of short-term investment capital, resulted in
difficulties in maintaining stability in the foreignexchange markets. In May, Austria and Switzerland
revalued their currencies upward by 5 percent and
7 percent respectively; also, Germany and The Netherlands decided to no longer maintain their currencies
within one percent of official parity and to allow the
values to float upward. This followed the path taken by
Canada a year earlier. Subsequently, in August Japan
also allowed its currency to float upward from official
parity.

3. Continued floating of the Canadian dollar until
some future date when circumstances permit fixing
a new official par value.
4. Widening of the range within which exchange
rates may fluctuate to not more than 2.25 percent
up or down from official par, instead of the previous
limit of one percent up or down.
The Outlook. The resources of the IMF and its capacity
for international monetary action have been a very real
source of financial strength in modern management of
international monetary affairs. The ability to create new
resources under the SDRs program adds significantly
to the Fund's potential for contribution to continued
expansion of world trade.

At the end of 1971, appreciation in currency values
stood at 15.2 percent for Japan, 12.1 percent for Germany, 11.4 percent for The Netherlands and 8.0 percent
for Canada. The IMF maintained consultations with these
members in the expectation that they would resume
maintenance of the one percent limits around new official par values as soon as permitted by circumstances.

The recent developments which are challenges to
the basic premises of the IMF and the international monetary program for which it stands may be highlighted
as follows:
1. Relaxing the commitment of major trading nations

Gold Convertibility. In recent years there have been
some important developments in the area of gold convertibility. In March 1968 a departure from the discipline
of the international gold-exchange standard occurred
when the central banks of five major IMF member
countries (U.S.A., U.K., Netherlands, Germany, Italy)

to maintain fixed exchange rates and limit fluctuations to a range of one percent up or down. The
discipline of the policy of fixed exchange rates is
onerous but it imparts a valuable stability to exchange dealings. With the broadening of the range
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of fluctuations to 2.25 percent up or down, the
question is whether the system can be managed
in a manner that will avoid uncertainties which
would hinder continued growth of world trade.
2. Abandonment of gold convertibility of the reserve
currency. This removes another discipline which
is basic to the IMF program for maintaining stability
of exchange values. The question is whether the
world any longer needs gold as a basis for the
international monetary system.
3. Freedom of foreign-exchange markets from governmental restrictions which could hamper the
continued expansion of world trade. The question
is whether movement away from the two preceding
basic premises will result in creation of insur-

mountable obstacles to the maintenance of this
third essential.
The real meaning of these questions is whether the
fundamentals of the system designed nearly 30 years
ago at Bretton Woods are still essential for the continued
growth of world trade, as a vital element toward the
high purpose for which the experiment in international
monetary cooperation was launched in 1944. Or, has
the world finally reached the point where disciplines
developed through the lessons of experience in an
earlier monetary era are no longer applicable? This
is what is being decided by world monetary leadership
in the current developments, with important future consequences for everyone involved in international business.
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